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Abstract: Transformation of energy systems is influencing economic policy agendas all over 
the world, particularly so in industrialized countries. In this process, Germany has taken a 
pioneering role. Technical innovations, institutional frameworks, and business models 
established there are of interest for other countries trying to achieve broader use of renewable 
energies. Energy cooperatives have been an important building block of the energy transition 
in Germany, though their practical importance is neither quantitatively nor qualitatively 
reflected in the academic literature. Drawing on recently collected data, this paper presents an 
overview of German energy cooperatives in terms of their (1) organization, (2) membership, 
and (3) financing. We then review theories from economics and the social sciences that, on 
various levels, have been used to analyze cooperatives in other fields or other forms of 
community-driven organization. We discuss how these theories could be applied for a better 
understanding of energy cooperatives, derive a preliminary research agenda and assess the 
scope for interdisciplinary work among economists, sociologists, and other related disciplines.  
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1. Introduction 
All over the world, the sought after transition of the energy sector towards greater deployment 
of renewable energy sources and de-carbonization is driving change in economic and 
environmental policy [1]. Against this background, different strategies such as large scale, 
centralized projects as well as small scale, decentralized projects are being pursued to achieve 
better diffusion of renewable energies. In this regard, especially industrialized countries are 
making efforts to promote decentralized energy supply concepts [2; 3; 4]. 
This general characterization of renewable energy deployment efforts particularly fits the case 
of Germany, where political measures have been laying a path toward development of a 
multi-faceted renewable energy sector with various technologies in use at different scales. A 
prominent example is the feed-in tariff system, which is based on the real generation costs of 
a specific technology and guarantees investment security for generators of green electricity 
for a time scale of up to 20 years [5]. Investment security ensured through the feed-in tariff 
system, improving technical aspects of renewable energy use, and a trend towards 
decentralization of energy supply have also allowed the entrance of new actors and business 
models in the German energy sector. In other words, technical and political change has been 
accompanied by changes in social institutions. Prominent among the groups of new actors are 
(family) farms and citizens, and business models often build on consumer participation and 
ownership, especially in the context of decentralized energy supply [6; 7; 8]. 
Within this context of new actors entering the market as investors and new emerging business 
models, energy cooperatives have gained particular attention, as they combine common 
economic goals with social and cultural factors, such as voluntary and open membership and 
considerable co-determination rights for their members through democratic organization and 
member control, features that seem to be particularly compatible with sustainability aspects 
characteristic of renewable energy projects [9].  
This particular focus on energy cooperatives has been reflected by a dynamic growth of 
cooperative organizations within the German renewable energy sector. Over the last ten years, 
more than 800 energy cooperatives have been newly founded in Germany (see section 2.1). 
Until now, however, research on energy cooperatives has been relatively rare, especially in 
Germany. The few existing studies are focused on practitioners’ problems and rarely build on 
existing theoretical foundations. The present paper attempts to address this gap by providing 
an overview of the phenomenon from the organizational and member perspectives, drawing 
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on recent data that include registration data from cooperatives, a member survey, and publicly 
available balance sheets. We also present various theoretical approaches that could be useful 
for shedding light on the development of energy cooperatives in Germany.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section two, the recent growth of energy cooperatives in 
Germany is described, a typology of energy cooperatives is presented, and cooperatives are 
distinguished from other forms of renewable-energy projects involving citizen participation. 
Further emphasis is put on financial characteristics and membership structures to introduce 
the reader to the topic from different viewpoints. The third section looks at the literature, 
starting with a governance perspective from transaction cost economics, which is then 
deepened via a discussion of recent work in behavioral economics, followed by a sub-section 
presenting the structural view. Here, the role of cooperative market power in non-competitive 
markets is stressed, followed by a section that looks at the role of consumers. Next, by 
looking at participation, conflict, and trust in (energy) cooperatives, we shift the focus from an 
economic to a sociological one. In a concluding section, we synthesize the literature in light of 
the empirical data analyzed and derive a research agenda for the field of renewable energy 
cooperatives in Germany.  
 
2. The Status Quo of Renewable Energy Cooperatives in Germany 
Empirical analysis is an important part of research on energy cooperatives in Germany, and 
topics such as growth, finance, or member characteristics have been addressed through 
various surveys. Before presenting our own empirical insights, we provide a brief, general 
overview on models of financial citizen participation in Germany. 
 
2.1. Models of Financial Citizen Participation in Renewable Energy Initiatives in 
Germany 
Community energy initiatives are multifaceted, and a diversity of ownership models exists 
concerning how to put them into practice. Projects can be either completely owned by the 
community or developed in co-ownership with the private or public sectors [10; 11; 12]. 
Patterns of ownership are determined by project initiators and managers [13], who themselves 
operate within the boundaries set by legal forms, financing schemes, and available equity 
capital [14]. In the following, differences between ownership models are explained in greater 
detail. 
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The proliferation of ownership options for citizen participation schemes in Germany has been 
discussed in a recent study by Holstenkamp and Degenhart, who use a financial approach 
focusing on equity capital and voting rights to distinguish between citizen participation 
schemes in a proper sense (community ownership) from mere financial participation. Apart 
from cooperatives, two ownership models are of importance. The most widely used structures 
are limited partnerships with a limited liability company as general partner (Gesellschaft mit 
beschraenkter Haftung & Compagnie Kommanditgesellschaft, abbreviated as GmbH & Co. 
KG) and civil partnerships (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts or GbR) [15]. 
In the first projects that were put into practice in Germany, choice of specific legal form was 
driven mainly by questions of liability and distribution of project risk [14; 16]. An answer was 
found in the GmbH & Co. KG structure, which merged two traditional legal forms: the private 
limited liability company and a general partnership. In this model, a developer of a limited 
liability company establishes a limited partnership for investors, and the GmbH takes on the 
“full partnership” role (with unlimited liability). Typically, the GmbH & Co. KG allows 
simplified management structures, separating management, consisting of project-initiating 
investors, from further investors. Furthermore, measured by return on equity after taxes, it can 
also provide possible tax advantages for investors over other organizational forms, depending 
on the personal income and tax parameters of investors [17]. These two aspects made the 
GmbH & Co. KG structure highly successful, and it became a preferred model for citizen-
owned wind parks (so-called “Bürgerwindparks”) in Germany [17; 18]. Another popular 
business model, particularly for small- to medium-scale local community solar PV projects, is 
the arrangement of a solar association as a trustee who establishes a GbR. A disadvantage 
here is the direct liability of the partners, which has made it feasible only for smaller projects 
[16]. 
Considering the recent trend towards energy cooperatives, the cooperative model possesses 
advantages that tend to influence the decisions of initiators. The crucial question of liability is 
solved by the cooperative model as well. Partners are generally not liable individually, which 
also makes the model attractive for larger projects [19]. Some key differences between a 
GmbH & Co. KG and a cooperative can be found in the purpose of their establishment and 
governance structures. For example, the cooperative model is linked explicitly to the 
promotion of its member’s goals, which generally also include social principles and values 
that go beyond profit maximization, including collaboration, social responsibility, in-company 
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democracy, communal self-help, and the provision of quasi-public goods [20]. Here, 
cooperatives can fill a significant gap, as discussed in the cooperative literature [21].  
Summing up, cooperatives are not the only relevant business model for financial citizen 
participation within the energy sector in Germany, but they are the organizational form that 
has become the most relevant regarding active participation in local energy policy. In the 
following, empirical data on energy cooperatives in Germany is presented. First, we review 
approaches used to classify them. Then, following one of the approaches, we present 
descriptive statistics on the growth of registered renewable energy cooperatives in Germany. 
 
2.2. Classification and Growth of Energy Cooperatives in Germany 
2.2.1. Existing Classifications 
A theoretically-informed typology of energy cooperatives in the German context and beyond 
– as a basis for theory-building [22] – is generally missing from the literature. The same can 
be said about establishing a link to general classifications and typologies of cooperatives 
according to strategic orientation, or ownership and control rights [23; 24]. Moreover, only a 
few studies have tried to classify energy cooperatives in Germany so far. Flieger and 
Klemisch draw a historical distinction between electricity cooperatives of the first phase of 
rural electrification in Germany and recently founded wind and photovoltaic energy 
cooperatives, bioenergy villages, national green electricity traders, and energy consumer 
cooperatives. For their classification, at least three attributes are implicitly used: energy-sector 
value chain, technologies in use, and age of cooperatives [25]. Klemisch and Maron use a 
typology by Flieger and suggest a separation of energy cooperatives along the energy-industry 
value chain [26]. These existing classifications lack, however, an empirical grounding and are 
not well-integrated into any theoretical framework. 
In the following, (1) technology, (2) level of value addition, (3) historical development, and 
(4) regional distribution are used as criteria for describing German energy cooperatives. The 
first two criteria are important especially for the economic analysis presented in section 3, 
whereas the latter two form the basis for political-economy, institutional, or evolutionary 
explanations. Data are drawn from a database of energy cooperatives in Germany, 
continuously updated and maintained by two of the authors [27], which builds on entries in 
electronic cooperative registries and information available on the internet. 
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2.2.2. Classification based on the Value Chain Approach and Technology 
The value chain of an organization consists of primary and secondary functions, which are 
separated by streams of inputs and outputs [28]. According to the value chain approach, 
energy cooperatives are defined as organizations with the legal form of a cooperative that 
conduct their business activities along the energy industry value chain. Adapting Porter’s 
corporate value chain concept to the energy sector, we distinguish between cooperatives 
according to their primary activities – generation/production, distribution/transmission, or 
trading – in the following way: 
 Generation/production (n = 635): Cooperatives that are classified as generation 
cooperatives possess power generation facilities or hold investments in companies that 
operate them. Generation in this case means not only of electricity but also heat. 
 Distribution/transmission (n = 198): Cooperatives that operate local electricity grids or 
local district heating networks are grouped as distribution cooperatives. Often these 
cooperatives also have generation facilities, but the network infrastructure is central to 
their business model and, thus, we group them together as distribution cooperatives. 
 Trading (n = 40): We classify as trading cooperatives those that primarily generate a 
spread by buying and selling energy (or energy resources). Cooperatives that sell the 
energy they generate are grouped as generation cooperatives, even if they are also 
traders. 
The technology-in-use classification is useful for further differentiating within the large group 
of generation cooperatives. With a few exceptions, most German energy cooperatives use 
renewable energy technologies that are promoted by the German feed-in-tariff system in 
accordance with the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG). Overall, power generation from 
renewable energy sources is dominated by electricity from windmills (7.9%), biomass (6.8%), 
photovoltaics (4.5%), and hydro power (3.4%) [29]. Most cooperatives are engaged in power 
generation using photovoltaics (495) followed by biomass (200) and wind (76). Hydro power 
(29) as well as solar thermal and geothermal power production (8) play a minor role. It is 
important to mention that many cooperatives use more than one power production technology, 
and only 29 cooperatives are engaged in fossil-fuel technologies.  
Activity has been mainly focused on photovoltaics because the technology is fairly simple, 
and it is easy to scale production-plant size according to available space. Often roofs of public 
buildings, such as schools or town halls, are used to install solar panels. Municipalities, 
churches, and other organizations are more likely to provide roofs to cooperatives as 
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compared to investor-oriented firms, and numerous cooperatives have occupied this niche 
market. In contrast, generation of electricity from windmills is not very common among 
cooperatives. Reasons are the greater risks and higher upfront investments involved; also, 
competition for land with other investors is fierce.  
 
2.2.3. Classification based on historical Development 
Cooperatives in the energy sector are not a new phenomenon. As opposed to the US 
experience [30; 31], however, German cooperatives in the energy sector have not received 
much attention in the academic literature. With more than 6,000 firms, electricity cooperatives 
– mainly rural distribution cooperatives – were the second largest group within the German 
rural cooperative association in 1930 [32]. Around 40 of these old electricity cooperatives 
survived concentration processes which followed the 1920s and reached a peak in the 1930s, 
and they continued through the liberalization of electricity markets in 1998. The following 
Fig. 1. displays the number of newly formed energy cooperatives over the past 35 years.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Number of newly Formed Energy Cooperatives in Germany in the Years 1980-2013. 
(Source: authors’ design) 
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It can be seen that few energy cooperatives were formed in the years 1970-1985. Mostly these 
were energy-supply cooperatives for member-supply and biomass cooperatives that processed 
biomass for energy generation. In the period that followed – 1985 to the mid-1990s – was 
dominated by small pilot projects pioneering in generation of electricity from renewable 
sources. The cooperative as an organizational form in the energy sector started to re-emerge 
with the rise of renewable-energy generation cooperatives and so-called bioenergy villages in 
the second half of the 2000s. The peak in growth in 2011 could indicate a saturation effect. 
Currently, cooperatives are facing difficulties in developing new business models, and the 
current number of 907 cooperatives may grow at a slower pace in the coming years. Further 
development especially hinges on concrete changes being made in the legal framework, as 
The Renewable Energy Sources Act is currently under revision. 
 
2.2.4. Classification based on regional Development 
Energy cooperatives concentrate in certain areas. Bavaria is the federal state with the largest 
number of them, followed by Baden-Württemberg, and Lower Saxony. This distribution is 
partly mirrored in the capacity of renewable-energy installations. It also is a result of diffusion 
processes and regional spillover effects. In some regions, renewable energy initiatives have 
attracted imitators. This has resulted in some spatial clustering of energy cooperatives, 
sometimes actively fostered by umbrella organizations. The cooperative association of the 
Weser Ems region has, for instance, actively promoted and supported the foundation of 
cooperatives in the region; meanwhile, the Agrokraft GmbH has sold the franchise-like 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Raiffeisen Energie concept.  
At the same time, as shown in Table 1, founding dynamics differ across federal states. Baden-
Württemberg and Bavaria have both shown similar growth in absolute terms in 2009-2011, 
but strongly differ before and after those years. Energy cooperatives are almost absent from 
some parts of Eastern Germany, which may be explained by the negative historical legacy of 
forced collectivization under the former socialist regime as well as lower disposable income 
and wealth. 
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Table 1. Regional Distribution by Years of Formation of Existing Energy Cooperatives in 
Germany. (Source: authors’ design) 
Period/ Year -1959 
1960 
- 
1979 
1980 
- 
1990 
1991 
- 
1997 
1998 
- 
2005 
2006 
- 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Federal State                         
Baden-Württemberg 3 1 1 0 1 4 21 28 45 27 26 157 
Bayern 28 5 1 1 9 10 22 28 43 55 48 250 
Berlin 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 5 2 9 21 
Brandenburg 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 4 4 14 
Bremen 0 0 0 0 0 2     1 2   5 
Hamburg 0 0 0 0 1 0     1   2 4 
Hessen 1 0 0 0 0 5 3 12 13 23 14 71 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 0 0 0 0 0 0   2 8 3 3 16 
Niedersachsen 2 6 0 2 3 19 21 17 26 16 14 126 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 5 1 0 0 1 5 12 20 21 13 11 89 
Rheinland-Pfalz 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 5 14 8 35 
Saarland 0 0 0 0 0 0   2 2 1 3 8 
Sachsen 0 0 0 2 0 3 2 2 4 6 2 21 
Sachsen-Anhalt 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 3 21 
Schleswig-Holstein 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 7 8 13 4 36 
Thüringen 1 0 0 0 0 1   3 7 7 14 33 
Total 41 14 2 6 16 55 92 132 194 190 165 907 
 
The numbers presented in this section provided a general overview of recent developments of 
renewable energy cooperatives. In the following, we seek to deepen the empirical analysis and 
provide insights on financial and membership characteristics. 
 
2.3. Financial Characteristics 
A detailed analysis of the economic development of energy cooperatives over time is missing 
from the literature as previous research has largely neglected financial issues and is based on 
small samples [19]. The following economic analysis of energy cooperatives attempts to fill 
this gap by evaluating a large number of German renewable energy cooperatives and 
analyzing their published financial statements for the period 2010-2012, focusing on 
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renewable energy generation cooperatives, which represent the largest group in the sector (see 
section 2.1.) [33].
1
 
The development of capital provides a general picture of the financial power and growth rates 
of organizations. Fig. 2. displays the amount of capital that was allocated by generation 
cooperatives between 2010 and 2012. The majority of these firms are relatively small. In 
2010, 69% of surveyed cooperatives each disposed of capital of up to one million Euros. In 
2012, this group covered 65% of surveyed cooperatives. Furthermore, a slight growth of 
larger renewable energy generation cooperatives can be observed up until 2012. The number 
of surveyed energy cooperatives that disposed of more than two million Euros capital 
increased from 14% in 2010 to 20% in 2012. Accordingly, the number of energy cooperatives 
that disposed of capital of up to two million Euros decreased from 86% in 2010 to 80% in 
2012. Consequently, it is likely that either existing energy cooperatives have raised more 
capital in order to increase project sizes throughout the observed years or that newly 
initialized projects have started with higher investment volumes. Yet very large energy 
cooperatives, those with a capital of more than five million Euros, remain an exception. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Capital of German Energy Generation Cooperatives in 2010-2012. (Based on [33]) 
 
In line with slightly growing investment volumes for new projects and the expansion of 
activity fields of established cooperatives, the number of members has risen as well. In 2010, 
                                                 
1
 The assessment was conducted by one of the authors in 2013/2014. More details on the data and further results 
are available in a discussion paper [33]. 
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about 62% of surveyed renewable energy generation cooperatives had between 3 and 100 
members, around 23% had between 101 and 200 members and 15% of surveyed renewable 
energy generation cooperatives had more than 200 members. In 2012, the share of energy 
cooperatives with 100-200 members increased to 30%, whereas the share of surveyed 
renewable energy generation cooperatives with 3 to 100 members decreased to 50%. 
Meanwhile, the share of surveyed energy cooperatives with more than 200 members slightly 
rose to 19%.  
Growing memberships may indicate that capital growth of German renewable energy 
cooperatives is primarily based on equity financed from members’ shares. As displayed in 
Fig. 3., surveyed energy cooperatives had relatively high equity ratios. Furthermore, equity 
ratios remained stable throughout the observation period. In 2010 as well as in 2012, 60% of 
surveyed generation cooperatives had an equity ratio between 31% and 100%. Respectively, 
40% of surveyed cooperatives had an equity ratio up to 30% in 2010 and 2012. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Equity Ratios of Energy Generation Cooperatives in 2010-2012. (Based on [33]) 
 
Against the background of the presented empirical results, three claims can be made. First, 
renewable energy generation cooperatives are small to medium-sized organizations. Second, 
high equity ratios are in line with fundamental cooperative principles. By collecting equity 
from their members, cooperatives realize member support and provide them with services 
[34]. Nevertheless, additional capital is needed to realize projects. This is mainly provided by 
loans from cooperative banks [19]. Third, the shift towards higher capital rates, high 
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membership numbers and stable equity ratios indicates that despite of growing investment 
volumes, financial requirements are still met to a great extent by members. 
 
2.4. Member Characteristics  
Besides the presented survey on developments in the cooperative sector in general and 
financial characteristics in particular, a closer look at member characteristics may reveal 
significant distinctions that can help us to better understand the success of renewable energy 
cooperatives in Germany. The following survey presents key characteristics of the social 
structure of cooperative members as well as their preferences regarding organizational 
aspects.
2
 
 
2.4.1. Social Structure 
In terms of age, the majority of cooperative members are older than 35 years of age, with 47% 
being 35 to 55, another 42% being older than 55 and only 12% younger than 35. Regarding 
gender distributions among energy cooperative members, we found that an overwhelming 
majority of energy cooperative members are men, representing 80%. 
Concerning educational backgrounds and income structures of involved individuals, further 
statistics are striking. The majority of energy cooperative members are university graduates 
(51%). Consequently, higher income groups are overrepresented: 71% have an individual 
monthly gross income over 2,500 Euros, 17.5 % have a monthly gross income of 1,500 to 
2,500 Euros, and the remaining 11.5 % have gross income of less than 1,500 Euros per month. 
 
2.4.1. Organizational aspects and member perceptions 
Data on the motives of participating members reveal a strong preference for democracy in 
organizational issues and regarding social issues. We found that 77% of the interviewees 
attribute democratic characteristics to energy cooperatives. Reasons given for this perception 
were the one-person-one-vote principle as well as the chance to participate, even with small 
investments. 
Although the interviewed cooperative members seem to appreciate the democratic character 
of energy cooperatives, their degree of active participation in organizational meetings and 
decision-making processes is middling, as only 28% are permanently present at organizational 
                                                 
2
 The survey was conducted by one of the authors in 2012. It is based on 2,826 respondents from 80 community-
energy initiatives. Out of these 1,872 people are members of energy cooperatives from all over Germany and 
from all renewable energy sectors (solar, wind, biomass). More results and background are available in [35].  
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meetings and another 24% are present frequently. Although 50% claim to participate actively 
in discussions and express themselves in meetings, a majority (76%) never initiates any ideas 
for further developing the cooperative, rather delegating this operative task to the executive 
committee. A reason for this seeming discrepancy might be that 96% of the interviewed 
members feel well informed with regard to their energy cooperative’s organizational and 
operative issues. 
Participation in an energy cooperative also led to significant attitude changes towards broader 
issues in the energy sector. According to a query where several answers were possible, 42% 
of members came to believe that a decentralized energy supply is a considerable alternative to 
centralized energy infrastructures after joining the cooperative. Furthermore, 41% support the 
further deployment of local community initiatives and 36% demand more citizen 
participation. 
These empirical insights reveal, first, a dominance of middle-aged men with academic 
degrees to be investors in renewable-energy cooperatives. A reason for this might be that, 
although energy cooperatives have comparatively low requirements for financial 
participation, the required amounts for membership pose in some cases an obstacle for 
individuals with restricted financial budgets. Consequently, individuals having an academic 
degree, who generally dispose of higher incomes, are overrepresented. Second, the ongoing 
growth of energy cooperatives seems to be induced by preferences of initiators for a high 
degree of participation, support for further deployment of renewable energy, and support for 
the decentralization of energy supply, rather than concerns about supply security, as the 
infrastructural conditions for rural energy supply through conventional energy suppliers are 
already given [36]. 
 
3. Theoretical Perspectives on Energy Cooperatives in Germany 
The objective of this section is to review the literature that may help to advance our 
understanding of energy cooperatives. Besides approaches already being used in the analysis 
of cooperatives in (agricultural) economics, we also look at some promising new approaches 
from behavioral economics and the sociological literature. 
 
3.1. Energy Cooperatives from an Economics Perspective 
From an economics perspective, energy cooperatives are distinct in many ways. Cooperatives 
do not have the objective of maximizing profits, as is typically assumed for the firm in 
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microeconomics. As an alternative to markets and hierarchies, they are consequently subject 
to different transaction costs. More than in investor-oriented firms, member behavior may be 
driven by concerns of fairness or other-regarding preferences. From a structural perspective, 
cooperatives have effects on market structures that differ from investor-oriented firms. Also, 
customers of energy cooperatives may have motivations that go beyond purchasing cheap 
electricity. The following sub-sections will address these issues in more detail. 
 
3.1.1. The energy cooperative as an organizational form: A transaction cost approach 
Fundamental analysis on governance and the theory of the firm dates back to the seminal 
work of Ronald Coase (1937), who was the first to note that using market mechanisms 
involves costs other than production costs. He showed that it is sometimes cost-efficient to 
execute transactions within a hierarchical organization, that is, not using market mechanisms. 
The costs of using market mechanisms for an economic exchange, later termed transaction 
costs, stem primarily from efforts to acquire information on prices and (potential) trading 
partners, to negotiate and to conclude contracts, and to monitor agreements. Additional costs 
result from modifying and enforcing contracts [37]. Building on Coase’s work, his analytical 
approach for determining the size of a company and regarding the analysis of operational 
coordination mechanisms has been continually developed. The properties of a transaction – 
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency – determine its transaction costs and, with a transaction 
cost minimizing agent, result in a governance structure that is optimally adapted to these 
properties. Within this context, a central role is played by specificity, which describes the 
possibility of an alternative use of assets and can lead to the so-called lock-in effect: an 
exchange-based dependency which can be exploited opportunistically by one of the exchange 
parties through the appropriation of relationship-specific rents. Consequently, concerns 
regarding the possible appropriation of returns usually play a crucial role in the assessment of 
the efficiency of a given governance structure for an economic exchange [38]. 
Within this typology of transaction costs and governance structures, cooperatives in general, 
and consequently also energy cooperatives, are classified as hybrids within the spectrum of 
coordination mechanisms, ranging from market to hierarchical organization. On the one hand, 
members pool some, but not all, of their qualifications and resources in the cooperative 
enterprise’s business. The use of the market is limited or even absent; hierarchy dominates. 
On the other hand, members of a cooperative remain economically independent, and they can 
use their qualifications and resources for other tasks, mostly for market transactions. To sum 
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up, the cooperative association possesses features that provide benefits in terms of integrating 
transactions into a collective organization while allowing independence of other operational 
aspects. However, this equilibrium is revocable, as a cooperative can lead up to the creation of 
a merged firm, if the characteristics of the underlying economic exchange call for more 
hierarchical organization (e.g., in cases of high specificity and high uncertainty), or can lead 
up to the dissolution of a cooperative, if the benefits of independence loom large. 
Cooperatives are often formed to economize on information costs or avoid opportunistic 
behavior and “hold-up” in the presence of specific investments [39].  
Although the field of energy cooperatives knows a variety of dimensions and forms, in 
practice several regularities can be identified that show in exemplary manner the hybrid 
character of energy cooperatives. The cooperative association is systematically oriented 
towards organizing activities through coordination and cooperation of involved actors (mostly 
private individuals). Consequently, fundamental operational decisions such as investments are 
undertaken jointly. A second feature is the pooling of resources and competencies, through 
which advantages can be generated from extended market shares, transfer of competencies, 
and sharing of scarce resources. Furthermore, the involvement of multiple parties and their 
resources offers risk-sharing possibilities. The pooling of resources and risk-sharing features 
are particularly relevant for citizens involved in generation cooperatives. Here, members can 
participate actively within local energy policy, without bearing extensive economic risks. 
However, contractual incompleteness within the institutional setting of relational contracting 
as a regulating measure for the relationships among the involved parties can induce 
opportunistic behavior, resulting in significant risks that are likely to remain in a cooperative 
organization [40]. 
Besides the menace of opportunistic behavior, a number of other disadvantages, resulting 
from shared property rights, constrain the organization of economic exchanges in a 
cooperative association. Departing from the analysis of cooperatives in the agricultural sector, 
problems devolving from the division of residual claims and control rights have become 
known as the (1) Free Rider, (2) Horizon, (3) Portfolio, (4) Control, and (5) Influence Cost 
problems, the relevance of which is explained in the following paragraphs. 
In the context of cooperatives, the Free Rider problem refers to scenarios where gains from 
cooperative action are accessed by individuals who do not participate in or contribute equally 
to the organization in comparison to other members. For example, new members receive the 
same patronage and residual rights as old members who have contributed over much longer 
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periods. The Horizon Problem describes divergences between a participant’s residual claims 
to her net income and the productive life cycle of her investment. This is caused by a lack of 
transferability of residual claimant rights and can lead to underinvestment in research and 
development or other intangible assets. Like the Horizon Problem, the Portfolio Problem also 
stems from the tied nature of equity in the cooperative. More specifically, changes in interests 
or risk attitudes of an investor cannot be immediately adjusted for within the cooperative, as 
wide agreement among members must be reached first. Such coordination problems of 
democratic governance, typical for cooperatives, represent the core of the Control and the 
Influence Cost Problems. The Control Problem is similar to the fundamental principal–agent 
problem set but is, in the context of cooperatives, further compounded by a lack of external 
competitive market pressures to discipline involved parties, particularly the executing 
managers of a cooperative. Finally, Influence Costs are incumbent on all organizations where 
decisions affect wealth distribution among members. They are greater, the more variable 
members interests and potential gains are [41; 42].  
For energy cooperatives, the Control and Influence Cost Problems are of particular 
importance. In general, it can be assumed that parties joining a cooperative have common 
interests. However, a detailed analysis may reveal that conflicting issues and heterogeneity 
potentially exist. Assuming that members of an energy cooperative have different institutional 
backgrounds (e.g. energy-consuming private individuals and resource-providing farmers in a 
bioenergy cooperative), it can be conjectured that conflicts may arise concerning the trade-off 
between what price to pay for input materials (e.g. energy crops) that represent an income 
only to some of the involved parties (e.g. farmers for the case of energy crops) and the 
residual claims of all involved parties on the net income of the cooperative, which is reduced 
by high prices for input materials. That is why, in practice, such a constellation of actors can 
rarely, if ever, be found organized within a single cooperative. Other relevant fields where 
such problems are even further aggravated are urban energy cooperatives [43, 44].  
To conclude, members of a cooperative might undertake efforts and bear costs to influence 
and control operative decisions, therewith reducing the transaction-cost efficiency of a hybrid 
organization. Especially in bio-energy cooperatives – where infrastructures at various stages 
are characterized by a complex value-addition process, including the energetic exploitation of 
raw materials and distribution of production output and waste – this problem may give rise to 
more hierarchical organization. In contrast, solar energy cooperatives are less prone to these 
problems, since the underlying technology does not rely on socially complex production 
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processes and, therefore, typically does not involve parties with heterogeneous interests. 
Consequently, the democratic organization of energy cooperatives and co-determination 
rights assigned to all members can generate extensive organizational costs, which may restrict 
their operational decision-making and management [44]. 
The findings of this sub-section have been gathered to provide a rationale for choosing a 
cooperative as an organizational form within the energy sector, given the assumptions of 
standard neoclassical economics. However, recent findings question this framework; 
consequently, the next sub-section is dedicated to the topic of behavioral economics, applying 
some findings of this field to several questions within cooperative analysis.  
 
3.1.2. A Behavioral Economics Approach to Energy Cooperatives 
Over the last three decades, insights from Behavioral Economics have challenged many of the 
assumptions underlying the model of homo economicus prevalent in Neoclassical Economics. 
Often through using psychological and economic experiments, humans have been shown to 
conditionally act cooperatively and to reciprocate behavior, to be loss averse rather than risk 
averse, and to act in contradiction with utility-maximizing behavior and full rationality more 
generally [45; 46; 47]. 
Experimental Economics, supported by evidence from Neuroeconomics [48], has furthered 
our understanding that in particular contexts – for instance when actors are socially proximate 
or market pressure is absent – decision-making processes of parties involved in an economic 
exchange can be influenced by preferences for fairness, reciprocity and other behavioral 
patterns that deviate from the assumptions of the standard economic approach depicted by the 
hypothetical figure of homo economicus [49].  
In cooperatives, as economic institutions whose initiators are typically individuals living in 
geographical proximity, where relations among involved parties are characterized by social 
proximity, and whose inter-firm rights of co-determination are based on a democratic 
principle rather than on voting schemes proportionate to equity, member behavior is often 
better characterized by the so-called cooperative spirit than the homo economicus model [39]. 
It is likely that concerns regarding fairness are important behavioral drivers in cooperative 
organizations, especially in comparison to investor-oriented firms, and it is, thus, surprising 
that virtually no behavioral research exists drawing on members of cooperatives as a subject 
pool, although potentially interesting and deviating behavioral patterns may be manifold.  
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First, experimental findings show that democratic institutions, such as those present in a 
cooperative association, affect the level of cooperation of parties involved in an economic 
exchange. Given a decision or policy, the level of cooperation is higher when decisions are 
made democratically by involved parties, whereas the same decision or policy imposed 
undemocratically through another mechanism does not induce similar levels of cooperation 
[50]. This is in accordance with the premise regarding the endogenous formation of 
preferences which states that economic institutions may affect preferences through their direct 
influences on situational construal, forms and structure of reward and incentive schemes, the 
evolution of norms, and task-related learning, as well as their indirect effects on processes of 
cultural transmission [51].  
Second, the comparably higher willingness to cooperate and the existence of fairness 
preferences seem to also affect the individual contributions of parties involved in a 
cooperative. The fundamental proposition from institutional economics’ Incomplete Contract 
Theory, that shared property rights lead to inefficiencies and underinvestment in the presence 
of incomplete contracts, is contradicted by experimental findings. Here, fairness preferences 
of some actors in a heterogeneous set of involved parties can act as an enforcement device 
that complements explicit incentives enforced by the courts such that joint ownership induces 
the most efficient ownership structure, as shown by high and efficient levels of investment 
under joint ownership in investment games [52]. These experimental findings can be 
explained as follows: First, cooperative members endowed with social preferences (e.g. 
fairness and reciprocity) are more likely to engage in mutual monitoring (of given levels of 
personal costs and benefits) which may prevent uncooperative members from appropriating 
rents from economic exchange. In other words, monitoring reduces the inequity among 
involved parties. What is more, cooperative members with a concern for fairness are less 
likely to act opportunistically. They can be best described as “conditional cooperators” who 
reciprocate the behavior of others, therewith reducing inequity, which may include 
uncooperative behavior as a means of punishing non-cooperators and restoring equality 
among involved parties in a cooperative [53]. 
These more general insights from behavioral economics are also of specific interest in the 
context of energy cooperatives. Here as well members typically originate from a common 
region and, in setting up the organization, require involvement of a wide set of actors in the 
enterprise’s activities. Social proximity and, therefore, social preferences are likely to play an 
important role in determining behavior – at least for some members. These effects, fostering 
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cooperative behavior, are further intensified by the fact that initiators of energy cooperatives 
often consciously decide in favor of the organizational form of a cooperative in order to play 
an active role in local energy policy. In this, their decision-making process tends not to be 
solely determined by monetary payoff considerations but is rather also influenced by civic 
virtues (see also section 2.4) which, in turn, foster cooperative behavior. 
To date, fairly little is known about behavior in cooperative organizations. More specifically, 
in spite of the wide range of behavioral economics applications drawing on subjects from 
business environments [e.g. 54], to our knowledge, cooperative members have not yet been 
subjected to experimental work. This is even more surprising if one looks into the 
mushrooming experimental literature seeking to extend the experimental subject pool beyond 
easily available students in all kinds of field studies [55; 56; 57]. Accessing members and 
managers of cooperatives for behavioral research is, thus, a promising task for future studies 
in order to be deal with questions that, thus far, could not be addressed with standard 
economics, such as cooperatives as an organizational form as seen from an incomplete 
contract perspective. 
 
3.1.3. Cooperative pricing under imperfect competition 
In recent years, Comparative Economic Organization and Transaction Cost Economics have 
played a dominant role in the development of cooperative theory. They have been successful 
in explaining why cooperatives are formed and under what conditions they can outperform 
investor-oriented firms (see section 3.1.1. and [58]). In the past, structural approaches rooted 
in industrial organization have also investigated what kinds of functions cooperatives perform 
for the economy as a whole [59; 60; 61; 62] More specifically, this strand of literature has 
looked into the role of cooperatives under conditions of imperfect competition. With upstream 
market power of processors and retailers prevalent in agricultural markets, this question also 
has received much recent attention from regulators and policy makers who often want to 
know what kinds of benefits cooperatives can create for the economy and society as a whole 
[63]. This has resulted in a small revival of empirical work based on this so-called 
competitive yardstick school of cooperative thought in agricultural economics, which argues 
that regional prices and prices investor-oriented firms have to pay are driven up [64; 65; 66]. 
Market power imbalances not only exist on markets for agricultural produce but also on those 
for electrical power, which are highly concentrated in most European countries. Although the 
shares of the largest four companies in Germany – Vattenfall, EnBW, RWE, and E.ON – are 
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decreasing through an influx of small-scale renewable energy generation, the “big four” still 
account for more than 80% of the retail market share [67]. In a recent study, the German 
competition authority has described these market structures as oligopolistic [68].  
It would, thus, be quite revealing to mimic the work of agricultural economists by 
investigating the effect of cooperative market share on prices, either within regions of a state 
[64] or across member states and time [65]. One challenge will be to construct panel datasets 
that allow identification of the respective effect [65]. 
 
3.1.4. Quality uncertainty and consumer demand for electricity from cooperatives 
There is some indication that the German transition towards a sustainable energy system is, at 
least to some extent, driven by consumers [69]. Today, at least 10 % of all households in 
Germany voluntarily opt for electricity tariffs entirely based on renewable energies [70], 
typically also involving price premiums which have been the subject of a mounting literature 
on stated and revealed preferences of consumers with regard to sustainable consumption and 
“green energy” in Germany and elsewhere [71; 72; 73]. 
Similar to organic or fair-trade food or, as in George Akerlof’s famous example, used cars 
[74], it is often not easy to distinguish quality differentials for a good when information on its 
characteristics is costly. As a result, adverse selection – a process where low-quality suppliers 
have an incentive to enter the market and, as a consequence of decreasing prices, drive out 
high-quality suppliers – may take place, ultimately bearing the risk of a complete market 
collapse. This can be especially true if aspects of the production process are an essential factor 
in consumer valuation for a good and, as in the case of household electricity, the good reaches 
the consumer in a homogeneous quality, independent of the particular supplier chosen. Put 
differently, renewable energy is a credence good; its consumption does not yield information 
on the production process, creating risks of adverse selection and fraud on the supplier’s side.  
As predicted by theory [74], this situation has resulted in various forms of transparency 
initiative, signaling, or guarantees on the supplier’s side. Providers of renewable energy spend 
much of their marketing budgets on elaborating how exactly the electricity they sell is 
produced, seeking to establish trustful relationships with consumers. Some large utilities in 
Germany promise to customers that they are establishing new renewable energy production 
capacities and that, for reasons of transparency, they do not engage in trading of renewable 
energy certificates at the stock exchange.  
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With respect to cooperatives, information asymmetries have mostly been investigated on the 
supply side. In rural finance or dairy processing, costs of locally available information can in 
many cases be reduced by integrating transactions into more hierarchical organizational 
forms, ultimately resulting in the identity of owners, producers, and processors [39]. The same 
applies to the energy sector, where much of the costly regulation of electric utilities in fully 
integrated markets can be avoided, especially in rural areas where energy cooperatives have 
been successful historically [43; 69]. Today, with unbundled electricity markets in Germany, 
the traditional cooperative model of user-owner identity is not fully applicable anymore. 
Greenpeace Energy, Germany’s largest electricity cooperative, supplies renewable energy to 
more than 100,000 customers but, in sharp contrast to agricultural cooperatives, where user-
owner identity is typically 100%, has only about 23,000 members. In other words, the vast 
majority of the users are neither members nor owners of the cooperative. These empirical 
realities also call for advancing cooperative theory [69]. 
A first step in this direction has been taken by Sagebiel et al., who investigate consumer 
preferences for electricity produced by cooperatives independent of the survey respondent’s 
membership status [75]. The authors conduct a Choice Experiment in which they distinguish 
between attributes of electricity contracts by focusing on the governance characteristics of 
suppliers. They do not find strong support for an increased willingness to pay for electricity 
from cooperatives. Rather, renewable energy and price seem to dominate respondent decision 
making. Yet, more research is needed to further substantiate these claims and to learn more 
about the motivations of customers to purchase energy from renewable energy cooperatives 
rather than from investor-oriented corporate suppliers with otherwise comparable features. 
 
3.2. Energy Cooperatives in the Social Sciences 
From a social-science perspective, energy cooperatives are first and foremost understood as 
social entities, characterized by multiple social relationships featuring individual and 
collective actions. Social scientists can employ a number of different perspectives in order to 
investigate energy cooperatives as social phenomena:  
On the macro level, energy cooperatives can be considered as societal and network actors 
embedded in social and environmental movements [76; 77]. Energy cooperatives can, for 
example, be viewed as actors in the energy transition and the social-ecological transition 
movement. 
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The meso level comprises inter-organizational processes. Here, energy cooperatives are 
recognized as actors of collective action. Different theoretical approaches, such as social 
psychology, socio-economics and socio-ethics, have been applied to study processes of 
decision making, participation, cooperation, strategies, discourses, ideas and visions in 
traditional cooperatives which might serve as future topics for discussion of energy 
cooperatives [78; 79]. 
In the following, however, we will focus on the micro level. Here, social scientists are 
concerned with inter-personal relations and behavior. Focusing on the micro level has two 
particular advantages. First of all, it allows relevant aspects of community building to be 
plausibly analyzed. Secondly, links to existing and on-going empirical observations can be 
made. We highlight three distinct micro-level phenomena: participation, conflict and trust. 
Analysis informed by these theoretical concepts is crucial for deepening the understanding of 
social behavior and relationships in general and energy cooperatives as social entities in 
particular, as they have received different forms of attention in the existing literature. 
 
3.2.1. Perspectives on Participation and Civic Engagement 
Participation and civic engagement are challenging research areas in the social sciences, 
especially in democracy theory and in studies focusing on community energy. In various 
ways, social processes and practices in and between energy cooperatives as well as other 
forms of community energy, affect principles of participation, engagement, collaboration, and 
citizen involvement. These are crucial in the debate on civil society and participation and 
include (1) political and social participation in the context of planning renewable energy 
plants through formal and informal participation practices [80], (2) financial and collaborative 
participation through membership in cooperatives with respect to organizational and internal 
participation practices [81], and (3) communicative and deliberative consensus dialogues, 
often known as participation through discourse [82].  
The “classical” way of classifying the level of citizen involvement in participatory processes 
has been provided by Arnstein’s “ladder of participation” [83]. Although originally developed 
for assessing degrees of citizen participation in public administrative processes, such 
approaches have also been extended to community energy initiatives with the aim of 
classifying levels of involvement of various in- and outside stakeholder groups. A challenging 
task will be to further develop the linear and hierarchical character of the model and to 
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integrate more horizontally oriented frameworks for analyzing community-energy initiatives, 
for instance from a social-learning perspective [84]. 
Regarding the discussion on the lack of legitimacy and shortcomings of representative 
democracy, new forms of citizen involvement are seen as a way to re-vitalize democracy [85; 
86]. Decisions made in energy cooperatives resulting from collective action processes may 
find greater societal acceptance, and may form broader consensus, than decisions made by 
investor-oriented firms [87]. Yet, as in other forms of non-profit sector organization, a lack of 
legitimization and representation may arise from access barriers set up by an organization to 
control membership composition and to grant access only to a selected few. On the other 
hand, energy cooperatives typically allow for broad participation of local citizens, are open 
and accountable, and do not discriminate against small investors. Although they lack the 
formal representation, legitimization, and control of public utilities, with these properties they 
have the potential to achieve a similar status. Further, participation and inclusion cannot only 
be reached through membership. As laid down in the International Co-operative Alliance 
(ICA) principles, the cooperative enterprise should share concern for the community. 
Consequently, it has the ability to build bonding social capital in local networks of diverse 
actors, therewith generating benefits beyond the immediate boundaries of the organization. 
Two important aspects of participation are thus crucial. First, the institutions formally 
governing a cooperative define the level of democratic control and possibilities for 
participatory processes within it. Second, and more informally, practices in a cooperative 
enterprise may spill over to the public, affecting both members and external stakeholders, 
while creating a network and (hopefully positive) experiences with participatory and 
democratic practices. 
 
3.2.2. Conflict in Energy Cooperatives 
Conflict is one of the key phenomena in the social sciences. It is seen as a mechanism 
inherent to social life and is deeply embedded in its social context [88; 89; 90]. Conflict 
within organizations can be broadly defined as the “perception of incompatibility between 
values, needs, interests or actions” [91] between individuals or groups. There is no integrative, 
overarching theory of conflict in cooperative organizations, and very little attention has been 
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paid to conflict within energy cooperatives. Therefore, we highlight some theoretical 
assumptions that can function as a starting point for further analysis.
3
 
A fundamental assumption of conflict theory is the notion that conflict supports change [89]. 
According to Pondy [88], conflict in an organization can have positive or negative effects on 
its productivity, stability, and adaptability, depending on a variety of factors. Since energy 
cooperatives in Germany frequently face legislative changes which require flexibility and 
adaptation, the impact of conflict on such organizations as a whole can be seen as decisive for 
their future. This assumption is supported by cooperative scholars, who regard the flexibility 
and adaptability of cooperatives as central for their survival in a constantly changing 
economic and political environment [93; 94; 95].  
Conflict theory illustrates that negative outcomes of conflict are especially triggered if norms 
and values are at stake [96]. Taking this into account, it seems vital to pay attention to the role 
values play in energy cooperatives. The importance of a “cooperative spirit” and clearly 
defined member value strategies for a cooperative’s success has been extensively discussed in 
the history of cooperative theory [97; 98]. Empirical studies show that individual definitions 
of cooperative spirit can vary even within cooperatives [99]. It has also been shown that 
founding members of energy cooperatives pursue a wide range of motivations which might be 
informed by underlying values that may be different from those of newer members [36]. 
However, neither the ways that values form a part of these different motivations nor the ways 
in which values are at stake in conflict within energy cooperatives have been investigated in 
depth. 
Regarding conflict causes, studies show that cooperatives struggle with a number of very 
different issues over time (see section 3.1.1. and [40]). While in the founding phase conflicts 
of interest and conflicts pertaining to values underlying a cooperative’s strategy might be 
more pronounced [95], issues regarding codetermination and agency, goals and appropriate 
governance approaches might be more relevant in later stages [100; 101; 102].  
Although there is also some work available on dispute-resolution mechanisms [103], 
empirical research on conflict in cooperatives mostly focuses on cooperative governance (see 
e.g. [104]). Findings suggest that conflict in cooperatives is more complex than, for example, 
in work organizations and, therefore, requires very particular management approaches [98]. 
Reasons for this include the diverse backgrounds and motivations of cooperative members 
                                                 
3
 Although we focus on intra-organizational conflict, energy cooperatives can also be examined as social actors 
in local and national conflicts over resources [92], as well as in other inter-organizational conflicts with other 
civil society actors, local administrations, regional cooperative associations, and other stakeholders. 
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[102], complex relationships among members based on member values [105], as well as the 
democratic nature of cooperatives, which makes conflict more pronounced and potentially 
more varied in them than in hierarchical organizations [106; 107]. Darr [106] illustrates how 
conflict can strengthen or weaken democratic structures within cooperatives. Cooperative 
structures can also lead to suppression of conflict or to sudden outbursts of it. Conflict may be 
suppressed because fear of losing face is evoked at the thought of voicing opinions in large 
meetings or because parties feel that voicing their opinions could put social relationships at 
stake [108]. Cooperatives therefore need to implement measures to facilitate conflict in 
advance or during board meetings, establishing small group discussions, self-audits or 
anonymous dispute-resolution mechanisms [108]. 
This brief review illustrates that the analysis of conflict not only can help to inform 
management strategies but also provides a lens through which we can learn more about the 
social dynamics and organizational development of energy cooperatives in general. While we 
can gain some insight into potential fields of conflict by drawing from existing literature on 
cooperatives in general and energy cooperatives in particular, we know very little about the 
causes, types, involved parties and other particularities of conflict in energy cooperatives, the 
social and cultural factors influencing conflict as well as the utilization and evolution of 
formal and informal resolution mechanisms. Empirical research is needed in order to better 
understand the nature of conflict and its potential impacts on the particular social structures of 
energy cooperatives as well as their organization. 
 
3.2.3. Trust in Energy Cooperatives 
Another aspect which is relevant to social relationships in organizations in general and in 
cooperative organizations in particular is trust [109]. Consequently, investigation of trust may, 
for instance, contribute to better understanding of the potential advantages of energy 
cooperatives in contrast to other forms of citizen-participation schemes and corporate projects 
for renewable energy. It may also provide some explanations for recent trends in the energy 
cooperative sector. 
Trust is seen as a highly problematic but recurrent feature of social relationships [110] and 
multiple definitions are in use [111; 112]. It has been claimed that trust provides a range of 
benefits and is seen as being essential to stable relationships, vital for maintenance of 
cooperation, fundamental for any exchange and necessary for even the most routine of 
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everyday interactions [110]. Referring to its benefits, trust has also been related to social 
capital as having impact on the organizational effectiveness or productive activity [113; 114].  
Since the 1990s, the concept of trust has been increasingly recognized by sociological theories 
as well as economists and management scholars [109]. Consequently, a large body of 
literature has developed that theorizes and empirically validates its various impacts. Luhmann 
[115] was one of the first to provide a theoretical approach to this concept. He understood 
trust as a function that reduces social complexity by going beyond available information and 
generalizing expectations of behavior so as to replace missing information with a sense of an 
internally guaranteed security [115].  
Up until now, little attention has been given to the role of trust in the context of energy 
cooperatives. Walker et al. [116] analyzed the concept in relation to the development of 
community renewable energy, problematizing the view that trust is a characteristic of the 
community approach as well as a project outcome which builds social capital. Their findings 
suggest that, although trust is one key component of the necessary conditions for a successful 
community energy project, it is not universally ensured solely by the community label but is 
rather dependent on the social dynamics of a project and what the actual community involved 
consists of [116]. 
However, substantial research has been conducted on the significance of trust in traditional 
cooperative organizations (e.g. agricultural cooperatives). Study findings have emphasized 
that trust plays a crucial role as, for example, a mechanism of control and coordination in 
processes of governance [112; 113; 117]. In this vein, Borgen [117] suggests that trust based 
on identification can mitigate the agency problem – an issue that applies especially to larger 
organizations and relates to the separation of ownership and control [118]. 
In the spirit of the open membership principle, the size of some energy cooperatives in 
Germany quickly increased after establishment, with the largest ones now comprising several 
thousand members (e.g. Greenpeace Energy with about 23,000 members) [119]. It has been 
argued that consequences from increased size may include higher complexity and 
heterogeneity and social ties becoming weakened [118]. If trust is a vital mechanism for the 
efficient coordination and operation of large memberships, sources of trust in energy 
cooperatives might be worth investigating and supporting.  
It can be assumed that forthcoming changes in the German Renewable Energy Sources Act 
and their potential implications for citizen-owned renewable energy projects could lead to 
increased professionalization in the energy cooperative sector. This might entail mergers of 
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established organizations, thus leading to the creation of larger units with the aforementioned 
challenges. 
A detailed review of the existing literature on trust and cooperatives may help to better inform 
the emerging energy cooperative sector about strategies for mitigating governance problems 
and enhancing efficiency. Empirical research is necessary to test the findings and assumptions 
already generated regarding the traditional cooperative sector by comparing them with 
renewable energy cooperatives. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
To better understand organizational changes in the German energy sector, energy 
cooperatives should be investigated thoroughly, since they represent a synthesis of 
technological and social change. As the phenomenon is particularly complex, an analysis 
from a variety of scientific disciplines is appropriate. The aim of this paper has been to 
respond to this task by combining an empirical overview of German energy cooperatives with 
theories that may be potentially useful as starting points for further empirical and theoretical 
analysis.  
As little is known about behavior in cooperative organizations, we have identified several 
tasks for further research for economists and social scientists. Experimental work could 
provide insights on the (endogenous) formation of other-regarding preferences within 
cooperatives. It is still an open question whether cooperatives attract particularly (socially) 
cooperative members, whether member distributional preferences are transformed by 
membership, or whether both processes are at work simultaneously. This methodologically 
challenging question could perhaps be best answered by carefully designed experiments and 
interview-based empirical research. Shedding light on this question could also help to explain 
why cooperatives exist, although they are not considered to be efficient from an incomplete 
contract point of view. Along these lines, transaction cost economics also offers potentially 
useful explanations for the (co-)existence of cooperatives with investor-oriented firms. 
Integrating findings from behavioral economics with transaction cost theory could be 
promising, and some initial steps in this direction have already been taken [44]. 
Another challenge is the question of cooperative pricing under imperfect competition. 
Agricultural marketing cooperatives typically organize the processing and selling of produce 
that is supplied to them by independent farmers. Most energy cooperatives, however, organize 
generation (i.e., production) from pooled capital. In addition, markets for renewable energies 
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are highly regulated, which may also impact price movements. To distinguish cooperative 
energy marketing and trading from generation and to identify their respective effects on prices 
and competition both theoretically and empirically is a challenging task. Yet, it may also be 
rewarding to revisit the classical works on cooperative pricing under imperfect competition, in 
order to find out more about the effects of cooperatives on the economic energy system as a 
whole. Likewise, the role of consumers in driving growth of renewable energy cooperatives 
remains largely unexplored. Although some exploratory research exists in this direction [75], 
it is still very much an open question whether the many customers of renewable energy 
cooperatives are willing to pay price premiums for the type of good they purchase (i.e., for 
electricity from renewable sources), whether they are paying for the way the good is produced 
(i.e., for consumer-controlled and democratically organized production), or whether these two 
things interact. 
For the social sciences, we have sought to demonstrate how theories of participation, trust, 
and conflict may illuminate our understanding of energy cooperatives as social phenomena at 
the micro level. Participation and civic engagement are essential preconditions for activating 
social capital and for achieving vital communities. In the end, we believe that these factors are 
decisive for determining success or failure of cooperatives. Investigating conflict can also 
contribute to understanding the nature of social relationships within cooperatives and their 
development as a whole. Such research is likely to have practical implications for the 
successful management of energy cooperatives as well. Trust creates social ties and cohesion. 
Further exploring the role of trust in energy cooperatives may lead to better understanding of 
inter-personal commitments therein. This can help to mitigate governance problems and 
enhance project efficiency. Integrating such sociological perspectives with the experimental 
economics approaches mentioned above could be promising. Trust games are one possible 
avenue for such research. In the future, it will also be important to put more emphasis on the 
role of policies, such as the Renewable Energy Sources Act. Our paper has not exhaustively 
discussed these issues. Reviewing political science theory could be one way to extend this 
discussion. Likewise, work in social, environmental, and consumer psychology, with a special 
emphasis on evaluating the potential of inter- and trans-disciplinary work, could also broaden 
the perspective that we have taken here.  
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